The European Union (EU) is one of the most prominent and powerful international organization in the world. The effectiveness of its power, both soft and hard, emanates from the credibility, reliability, stability, strength, impact, influence, extent, and magnitude of its members states. From the creation of the European Atomic Energy Community and the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957, the EU has considerably changed both in size and in its institutions. At the same time political and economic transformations and revolutions like and the restoration of democracy in Portugal, Spain and Greece and the communist collapse in 1989 triggered the necessity for an enlarged EU. The transition from the EEC to the EU was at the same time a prerequisite and a necessity for the stability of the European community. However, even though the 2004-2007 European enlargements were successful in many respects, they caused growing anxieties for the future of the process itself. In addition, the question for a further enlargement becomes more difficult when the case of Turkey has to be answered. There is an increased theoretical and practical discussion whether a future Turkey’s membership will strengthen or weaken the EU and whether the EU member states will keep their commitment for enlargement. This essay will begin by introducing the historical evolution and the conditions of the relationship between the EU and Turkey. It will then go on to the analysis one of the theoretical approach that approximates the enlargement process and more specifically the liberal intergovernmentalism. The third section will analyze and evaluate how a future Turkey’s membership will strengthen or weaken the EU. Finally, in the fourth chapter it will draw the most important conclusions. As a consequence, this essay will focus on the issue of the enlargement process and more specifically on the issue of the future Turkey’s membership by noting that even though there are many reasons that a prospect membership of Turkey will weaken the EU, Turkey is a necessary piece for the European architecture for many reasons and the leaders of the EU cannot refuse a future membership because a future rejection may negatively affect the European rationale for a consolidate international organization.
2. THE EU-TURKEY RELATIONS AND CONDITIONS.
Turkey and the EU have a profound history in terms of enlargement. In 1963 the Ankara association agreement was signed among the EEC and Turkey. The creation of a custom union between EEC and Turkey was its main purpose. The custom union finally established in 1995 eight years after Turkey’s application for full membership in the EEC. The Helsinki European Council in December 1999 recognized Turkey as an official candidate country for EU membership and in October 2005 the negotiations for accession begun. Finally in 18 February 2008 a new accession partnership was signed between Turkey and the EU . However, it can be said that Turkey was not confronted equally from the EU and this became clear when Greece applied to join the EU. As Smith (2003, p. 111) notes ‘Such considerations did not, however, work in Turkey’s favour. As a result, the above crawl evolution of EU-Turkey relations are indicative of how Turkey is confronted from the EU member states.
Indeed, Turkey is considered as a tough matter for the EU foreign and internal affairs. Turkey has a population of nearly 72 million people and it belongs in the crossroads of Asia, Africa, and Europe. It has a stable political system that many times can be helpful for the western aspirations and interests and it is the closest country to Middle East, Russia, Caucasus and Black Sea region. However, its political and economic magnitude and extent not only create positive conditions for membership but also generate negative approximations. Turkey can also become a detrimental condition for the EU’s functioning and perspective. As Michael Burgess (2009, p. 40) stresses for the previous enlargement ‘the admission of so many countries with so many different national goals and policy priorities has undeniably altered the very nature of the European project and introduced different dynamics that cannot be gainsaid’. The same can be applied for the case of Turkey.
The last European progress report mentions that Turkey has significant deficiencies in political criteria, in democracy and the rule of law (public administration reform, judiciary, civilian oversight of the security forces), in human rights and the protection of minorities, in regional issues and international obligations and in economic criteria (European Commission, 2009b). The above and many other conditions can be very harmful for the future of the EU. It can be said that Turkey will weaken the EU because not only it does not belong to the EU geographically and identically but also because it has many structural and institutional weaknesses. As Sedelmeier (2005, p. 425) states ‘The European council has approved the opening of accession negotiations with Turkey for 2005, but the country continues to present the EU with difficult dilemmas and to receive a mix of ambivalent signals from the EU’s member governments’. It is clear that ‘the EU determines its own nature whenever it chooses to (or not to) enlarge its membership’ (Avery 2008, p. 180). As a result, Turkey’s prospect for membership can be an excellent paradigm for the question of whether or not enlargement strengthens or weakens the EU? 3. THEORETICAL APPROACH.
Donald Puchala in 1972 described that the study of European integration is very difficult because theorists of integration look like a group of blind people who attempt to detect an elephant but each of them touch various parts of the animal (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2006). As Smith (2005, p. 284) states for the enlargement of CEEC’s (Central and Eastern European Countries) ‘Explaining why the member states have agreed to enlarge-when the costs are not only large but unevenly distributed- requires the use of several theoretical approaches’. It can be said that the same can be applied for the case of Turkey.
In order to analyze and evaluate whether Turkey’s prospect membership will strengthen or weaken the EU, a multidimensional and multi-theoretical approach is needed. Turkey’s Membership will directly affect the political, institutional and economic conditions of the EU. Moreover, the international, geopolitical and security role of the EU will change with the Turkish Membership. In addition, the issue of the shared European identity will be contested. In fact, strengthens and weaknesses of a prospect turkey membership can be analyzed in five main categories. According to Nugent (2003) these are the impact on identity, on institutions and decision making process, on internal dynamics and balances, on economics and on external relations and policies. As a result, it could be argued that the one-dimensional theoretical approach it will not be an indicative paradigm. Although this essay is focused on the liberal intergovernmentalism, a wider perception is adopted in order to answer the question whether or not a Turkish membership will strengthen or weaken the EU.
This essay will focus on the liberal intergovernmentalism and its main theoretical tools because it is not a theory of a unique political interest. As Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig (2009, p. 68) state ‘It argues that one cannot explain integration with just one factors, but instead seeks to link together multiple theories and factors into a single and coherent approach appropriate to explaining the trajectory of integration over time’. In fact, liberal intergovernmentalism assumes that states are actors and more specifically rational actors in political affairs. A rational actor is an actor that ‘calculate the utility of alternative courses of action and choose on that maximizes (or satisfies) their utility under the circumstances’ (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009, p. 68).
Under these circumstances liberal intergovernmentalism ‘predicts that members will calculate the advantages of enlargement in terms of the cost and benefits of socioeconomics interdependence of various types’ (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009, p. 80). However, this is not to say that geopolitical preferences or ideology is not important for the European integration. Rather, as Moravcsik (1998, p. 3) states ‘sometimes, geopolitical concerns played an important role’. According to Muftuler-Bac (2008, p. 209) ‘The Utility-based arguments on Turkey’s membership and the material costs and benefits for the future of Europe can be grouped as (i) its impact on European Security; (ii) its impact on the EU institutions; and (iii) its impact on the EU budget and economy’. As a result, liberal intergovernmentalism seeks to analyze how can we rescue and adapt the nation states mainly by analyzing state preferences not only in economical but also in geopolitical and ideological field (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig, 2009). Turkey’s membership could affect not only the nature and the functioning of the EU but also many of the theoretical arguments.
4. HOW TURKEY’S PROSPECT MEMBERSHIP STRENGTHEN OR WEAKEN THE EU.
It can be said that all the previous enlargements had a positive impact on the EU. However, this cannot be said for the case of Turkey. One could easily identify many elements that could negatively affect the EU when Turkey will become a member. For example, Vachudova (2007, p. 120) states that ‘Turkey is a large state that for myriad reasons would be difficult for the EU to absorb even if the benefit of doing so would be considerable’. Furthermore, it can be argued that Turkey raises questions about ideology, identities, geography, population, development, economics, geopolitics, politics and security. One of the major questions about Turkey’s membership is whether or not Turkey could affect the EU’s common identity. In fact, there are many answers to the above question. Moreover, Nugent (2003, p. 498) states that ‘questions have been raised about whether it is in the EU’s interests to admit an Islamic country most of which is geographically in Asia’. It is fact, that a prospect Turkey’s membership ‘would push the EU’s borders into some of the world’s politically more troubled regions’ (Vachudova 2007, p. 120). Thus the EU will acquire ‘direct contact with regions of instability’ (Avery 2008, p. 193). However, neither the geographical explanation seems to be a significant reason for the European states to deny membership to Turkey.
In addition, it can be said that the economic calculations are the most prominent elements in the theory of Liberal intergovernmentalism. According to Nugent (2003) there can be identified three main economic difficulties that could possibly undermine the EU functioning. These can be observed on income, agriculture and competitiveness. Turkey’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is less than 30% of the EU’s average and its agriculture labour force is 16% compared with the less than 5% in the EU (Nugent, 2003). The aforementioned economic conditions could wider the poverty gap in the EU. It is fact that ‘with eastern enlargement in 2004 and 2007 the poverty gap between the member states grew considerably’ (Laffan and Stubb 2008, p. 78). Furthermore, Muftuler-Bac (2008, p. 211) identifies that ‘the possible burden on the EU budget, because of structural funds and possible flow of migration from Turkey’ is the most important material costs for Turkey’s accession. Moreover, these costs could lead to ‘impose strains on the structural funds and lead to demands for more generous redistributive policies’ (Nugent 2003, p. 504). The aforementioned statements are significant negative factors that weaken not only the nature but also the functioning of the EU.
In addition, it can be said that as Laffan and Stubb (2008, p. 79) state ‘after eastern enlargement many of the former recipients of cohesion funds were no longer eligible for many EU funds’. According to Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig (2009, p. 81) liberal intergovernmentalism predicts that ‘the negative position of countries like Italy and Greece, despite their border position, reflects the potential losses enlargement imposed via trade and budgetary competition’. It is clear that Turkey’s membership could deteriorate the distribution and redistribution of the EU’s funds. It seems that questions about cultural linkages, political considerations and the budget distribution may affect the reluctance or willingness of the EU to admit Turkey (Flam, 2003). As a result, it can also be said that they could be the causes for the European deny.
Furthermore, it can be argued that Turkey could negatively affect the EU’s decision-making process. As Laffan and Stubb (2008, p. 89) note the EU ‘it was widely agreed that it needed new rules to streamline decision making to avoid paralysis in the long term’. In addition, there are fears that Turkey as one of the largest states in the EU could deteriorate not only the voting relations between the members states but also the whole political and institutional European architecture. (Baldwin and Widgren, 2005). As Muftuler-Bac (2003, p. 213) stresses ‘Turkey’s impact on EU decision-making under double majority voting system in the Council will be substantial. […] since Turkey has a population of 71 million, predicted to increase to 83 million by 2014, it would make Turkey the most powerful country in the voting system’. However, many other could argue the opposite because before European enlargements, can be identified the creation of a more coherent and stable decision making process and institutional architecture.
Moreover, it is fact that Turkey’s membership could affect the public opinion against the EU. According to Avery (2008, p.193) public opinion ‘is influenced by fear of an influx of Turkish migrant workers and the idea that Turkey is different-that is not pat of Europe in geographical terms’. In addition, Vreese, Boomgaarden and Semetko (2008, p. 523) identify that ‘it was the inclusion of soft predictors such as feelings of identity and anti-immigrant ion attitudes that contributed most’ to the aforementioned result. As a result it can be observed the existence of significant European opposition to Turkey and more important in Austria, France and Germany (Muftuler-Bac, 2008).
Besides, it is clear that ‘we are well advised to turn also to the role of political elites and the media and their framing of the issue’ (Vreese, Boomgaarden, and Semetko 2008, p. 524). This is an interesting factor that could negatively affect not only the functioning of the EU but also the public opinion for the enlargement. As Nugent (2003, p. 504) states an enlarged EU ‘will also be much more heterogeneous in its membership and so will find it even more difficult than it already does to develop united stances on the bases of shared identities and interest’. Moreover, it can be argued that Turkey’s membership will create new instability problems for the EU. As Giamouridis (2007, p. 200) observes ‘Turkish accession means that the EU in reality swaps the instability problems of a stable neighbour with severe instability problems of Iran Iraq and Syria’. It is clear that Turkey could undermine the European common foreign and security policy and thus the EU as an international actor.
In contrast there are many other reasons that a Turkey’s membership could positively affect the EU. It can be noticed that as Pahre and Ucaray-Mangitli (2009, p. 379) state ‘Turkey’s room for influencing the EU is surprisingly narrow, despite many worries to the contrary’. Firstly, it can be said that Turkey will not affect the European identity. Sjursen (2002, p.509) observes that ‘the acceptance of Turkey as a candidate suggests that the understanding of what it is to be European is not contingent on political categories identities are malleable and they are shaped and reshaped through communicative processes’. In fact, whether identity is important for the EU or whether it strengthens or weakens the EU is questionable.
Secondly, Nugent (2003) identifies economic, political, security and moral motivations for a prospect enlargement. As liberal intergovernmentalism predicts the EU has mainly ‘concrete economic interests rather than other general concerns like security and ideas’ (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009, p. 70). It is fact that Turkey is one of the largest markets in the world and it is the seventh major import partner with the EU and the fifth major export partner (European Commission 2009c). As Avery (2008, p. 192) notes ‘its growing economy and young labour force would bring benefits for the single market’. It is unquestionable whether the EU will need the young and cheap labour force for its future development and economic growth. Besides, Muftuler-Bac (2008, p. 210) believes that ‘the economic-based benefits of Turkey’s accession are the dynamic Turkish market with its huge consumer potential and the large labour force from Turkey which help ease the labor market problems in the EU with its declining population growth rates. Furthermore, as Laciner (2005, p. 78) states ‘Turkey will have a vital role in the steady and secure flow of energy that the EU ill require in 21st century’. It can be argued that in economic terms Turkey not only is important to the EU both for its impact on internal and external economic relations but also that it will strengthen the EU’s economic capabilities.
Thirdly, it can be observed that any time that the EU was expanded its institutional structure was strengthening before the enlargement. As Avery (2008, p. 181) observes ‘it is often followed by the development of new policies and the strengthening of the institutional framework’. As a result, it can be argued that a prospect Turkey’s membership could reinforce not only the institutional and constitutional structures but also the so called deepening of the EU.
Fourthly, it is clear that ‘an enlarged EU will carry more political weight in its external relations and policies’ (Nugent 2003, p. 504). In fact, it can be said that Turkey’s membership in the EU will trigger the development of the European common foreign and security policy (CFSP) (MacMillan, 2009). Furthermore, Turkey will strengthen the EU’s relations with the United States and Russia. For example, Meyer (2004) focuses on the possible positive impact of Turkey on Russia. He notes that ‘both Turkey and Russia, as Eurasian powers, must become a part of this new Europe. Accordingly, Turkey’s accession to the EU will, to some extent cement Russia’s links with this organization’ (Meyer 2004). In addition, it can be said that ‘Turkey projects stability and contribute with its European partners to the struggle against terrorism, illegal migration and drug smuggling and would be able to perform this role more effectively if it was a full member of the Union’ (Logan 2009, p. 34). Finally, it can be argued as Logan (2009) believes that in order to tackle with the huge challenges and opportunities in the Middle East both Turkey and the EU are required to cooperate and to work together.
Moreover, it can be said that Turkey will assist the EU to combat against terrorism, extremism and intolerance (Laciner, 2005). Besides, Ozcan (2005, p. 134) stresses ‘Turkey’s accession process will increase its internal stability and well-being. This will affect the region and will encourage the unstable countries in the region to develop more political and cultural cooperation with Turkey’. In addition Bal (2005) focuses on the Turkey’s strategic importance in fighting global terror. He notes that ‘Turkey is an important leverage and partner for the EU due its policy of moving beyond rhetoric and jargon in fighting global terror’ (Bal 2005, p. 166). Moreover, as Logan (2009, p. 43) state ‘in geostrategic terms, Turkish accession to the EU will be an important asset for Europe and not a step which exposes to Middle Eastern insecurities’. As Vachudova (2007, p.120) notes ‘abandoning enlargement would have a visible cost for the credibility of the EU’s emerging foreign policy and for geopolitical economic stabilization of its neighboring regions’. As it can be noted from the aforementioned facts a prospect Turkish enlargement could strengthen every piece of the European common foreign and security policy and the geopolitical position of the EU. Although according to the liberal interngovernmentalism geopolitical reasons have minor only effect for enlargement decisions, it is fact that they cannot be undermined.
Finally, it can be said that the EU has not only a moral obligation not to deny the membership to Turkey but also a serious reasons related with credibility and legitimacy of the EU. As Smith (2005, p. 284) summarizes ‘The sense of responsibility toward the candidate countries, the sense of shared European identity, the strategic imperatives favouring big bang enlargement and the fact that the EU could not have backed down from is promises without a serious loss of credibility and legitimacy all helped to sustain the momentum’. Moreover, it can be argued that ‘with its unique geography, its remarkable economy, dynamic population, its approach embracing democratization and free market economy, Turkey will make significant additions to the EU’ (Laciner 2005, p. 86). As a result, Turkey’s membership will provide multiple strengthens in the EU not only in economic and geopolitical terms but also in the legitimization and credibility of the European architecture.
5. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, this essay has given an account and evaluation of negative and positive conditions that affect Turkey’s membership on the EU. As it demonstrated a membership of Turkey in the EU could undermine not only the prosperity, competitiveness and welfare in the EU but also it could affect the structural funds and the redistributive policies like agriculture. However, one could argue that the aforementioned negative conditions have only a minor importance. Thus, Turkey’s negative influence to the EU is narrowed. At the same time many positive conditions of how a future Turkey’s membership will strengthen the EU can be calculated. Taken together, these conditions suggest that it is not obvious to recommend that Turkey should become a member of the EU. According to Muftuler-Bac (2008, p. 217) ‘what carries greater weight is whether the EU is capable of digesting a large and culturally different country as Turkey’. As MacMillan (2009, p. 806) stresses ‘the end is still not certain, and is largely dependent on both Turkey and the EU’. The question of whether or not the EU and Turkey have a ‘common destiny’ is depended on an ethico-political plan (Parker, 2009). As Smith (2005, p. 272) notes ‘the ghost of enlargement will hover the EU’s relations with its European neighbours for some time to come’. But one can be said for sure ‘Turkey’s Accession to the EU is going to be Europe’s self-denial’ (Laciner, Ozcan and Bal 2005, p. 14). Neither geography nor culture and religion are significant factors to deny Turkey’s membership. Considerably more work will need to be done to determine whether or not Turkey’s future membership strengthens or weakens the EU. Finally, as Muftuler-Bac (2008, p.217) points out ‘the debate has to be formulated in such manner that it would have to respond to the people’s concerns simply emphasizing the material costs and benefits of Turkey’s accession will not suffice.
7. REFERENCES Avery, G., 2008. EU Expansion and Wider Europe. in Bomberg, E., Peterson, J., and Stubb, A., 2008. The European Union: How does it Work?. The New European Union Series, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Bal, I., 2005. The Security Policies of the Turkey-EU Axis in Fighting Global Terror: An Alternative? Laciner, S., Ozcan, M., and Bal, I., 2005. European Union with Turkey: The Possible Impact of Turkey’s Membership on the European Union. ISRO Publication, Ankara. Baldwin, R., and Widgren, M., 2005. The Impact of Turkey’s Membership on EU Voting. Centre for European Policy Studies, Policy Brief No. 62. Burgess, M., 2009. Federalism. in Wiener, A., and Diez, T., 2009. European Integration Theory, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, M., 2006. Debates on European Integration: A Reader. The European Union Series, Palgrave MacMillan, New York. European Commission (a) Internet Link: [ec.europa.eu] Commission, 2009b. Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2009-2010. COM (2009) 533, Brussels.European Commission, 2009c. EU Bilateral Trade and Trade with the World. i [trade.ec.europa.eu] H., 2003. Turkey and the EU: Politics and Economics of Accession. Stockholm University Institute for International Economic Studies, Seminar Paper No. 718. Giamouridis, A., 2007. Only through Enlargement. The New European Myth. European Foreign Affairs Review, 12, 183-202.Laciner, S., 2005. Possible Impacts of Turkey’s Full Membership to EU’s Foreign Policy. in Laciner, S., Ozcan, M., and Bal, I., 2005. European Union with Turkey: The Possible Impact of Turkey’s Membership on the European Union. ISRO Publication, Ankara. Laciner, S., Ozcan, M., and Bal, I., 2005. European Union with Turkey: The Possible Impact of Turkey’s Membership on the European Union. ISRO Publication, Ankara. Laffan, N., and Stubb, A., 2008. Member States. in Bomberg, E., Peterson, J., and Stubb, A., 2008. The European Union: How does it Work?. The New European Union Series, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Logan, D., 2009. Turkey and its Middle Eastern neighbours: Threat or Opportunity for the European Union?. Asian Affairs, 40 (1), 34-43. MacMillan, C., 2009. The Application of Neofunctionalism to the Enlargement Process: The case of Turkey. Journal of Common Market Studies, 47 (4), 789-809.Meyer, M., 2004. Russia-Turkey-EU: Partnership Inevitable. Novosti, Russian News and Information Agency. Moravcsik, A., 1998. The Choice for Europe. Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht. Cornel University Press, Ithaca. Moravcsik, A., and Schimmelfennig, F., 2009. Liberal Intergovernmentalism. in Wiener, A., and Diez, T., 2009. European Integration Theory, Oxford University Press, OxfordMuftuler-Bac, M., 2008. Turkey’s Accession to the European Union: The impact of the EU’s Internal Dynamics. International Studies Perspectives, 9, 201-219. Nugent, N., 2003. The Government and Politics of the European Union. The New European Union Series, Palgrave MacMillan, New York.Ozcan, M., 2005. Turkey’s Possible influences on the Internal Security of the European Union: The Issue of Illegal Migration. in Laciner, S., Ozcan, M., and Bal, I., 2005. European Union with Turkey: The Possible Impact of Turkey’s Membership on the European Union. ISRO Publication, Ankara. Pahre, R., and Ucaray-Mangitli, B., 2009. The Myths of Turkish Influence in the European Union. Journal of Common Market Studies, 47 (2), 357-384.Parker, O., 2009. Cosmopolitan Europe and the EU-Turkey Question: the Politics of a Common Identity. Journal of European Public Policy, 16 (7), 1085-1101.Sedelmeier, U., 2005. Eastern Enlargement: Towards a European EU?. in Wallace, H., Wallace, W., and Pollack, M., 2005. Policy-Making in the European Union. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Sjursen, H., 2002. Why Expand? The Question of Legitimacy and Justification in the EU’s Enlargement Policy. Journal of Common Market Studies, 40 (3), 491-513.Smith, K., 2003. The Evolution and Application of EU Membership Conditionality. in Cremona, M., 2003. The Enlargement of the European Union. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Smith, K., 2005. Enlargement and the European Order. in Hill, C., and Smith, M., 2005. International Relations and the European Union. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Vachudova, M., 2007. Historical Institutionalism and the EU’s Eastward Enlargement. in Meunier, S., and McNamara, K., R., 2007. Making History: European Integration and Institutional Change at Fifty, The State of European Union. Volume 8, Oxford University Press, Oxford.Vreese, C., Boomgaarden, H., and Semetko, H., 2008. Hard and Soft: Public Support for Turkish Membership in the EU. European Union Politics, 9 (4), 511-530.
Διαβάστε όλο το άρθρο στο "Πολιτική και Απόψεις" »
Μεταφράστε αυτό το άρθρο (Translate this article) »
